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of outcomes in the Eurocrisis
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Department of Public Governance and Management, University of Ghent, Amsterdam, WV, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The Euro crisis has produced a plethora of new institutions, policies,
and projects to reform the Euro Area. This paper oﬀers a theoretical
and empirical contribution in the study of the New Economic
Governance. By building on insights from classical Neofunctionalism
and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the paper revisits the static com-
ponent of Philippe Schmitter’s ‘Neo-Neofunctionalist’ framework.
Static Neo-Neofunctionalism is then applied as a means to provide
a systemic interpretation of crisis-led integration in the Euro crisis. The
large majority of episodes of crisis-led integration in the 2011–2016
years is included in the analysis. In assessing Neo-Neofunctionalist
expectations on the New Economic Governance, the paper matches
analysis of legal documents with the results of a dedicated Expert
Survey on the EMU governance ﬁelded in October 2018.
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1. Introduction
The Euro crisis has produced several new institutions, policies, and projects to reform
the Euro Area. Such a reaction to the Euro crisis was, to some extent, expected and even
anticipated: one of the leading approaches to European Integration, Neofunctionalism
and related theories, has always postulated that integration advances through crises.
Neofunctionalist approaches1 retain two fundamental areas of interest: the dynamic
relationship over the long term between chains of crises and integration and the static
analysis of the outcomes of a given crisis. While the long-term dynamics of integration
and crisis is investigated in a dedicated work (Nicoli 2019), this article is concerned with
a static analysis of the consequences of the Euro crisis for European integration, as they
manifest in the development and/or construction of (new) institutions, policies and
procedures.
The theoretical interpretation of the Euro crisis remains disputed. On the one hand,
the Euro crisis provided impetus for an intergovernmental overhaul of the EU: after all, the
crisis resulted in three new intergovernmental treaties and one treaty amendment; in 41
European Council meetings from 2010 to 2015, on average one each 50 days. However,
scholarship on the Euro crisis has gone beyond intergovernmentalism. Contributions to
the literature on the applications of grand-theories of European integration to the Euro
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crisis have ﬂourished through (at least) four distinct approaches. For instance,
Schimmelfennig (2015a, 2015b, 2018b) provides liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) inter-
pretation of the Euro crisis; Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter (2015) forge the term ‘new’
intergovernmentalism (NI) to analyse post-Maastricht period, including the crisis; Bauer
and Becker (2014; Niemann and Ioannou (2015) and Schimmelfennig (2018a) provide
diverse neofunctionalist (NF) accounts of the Euro crisis; and ﬁnally, Fabbrini (2015),
Dawson (2015) and Jones et al. (2016) provide various ‘hybrid’ interpretations of the crisis,
cutting across theoretical boundaries. Each of these approaches possess its own strengths
and limitations. In light of these, this paper suggests that complementing existing
neofunctionalist and hybrid scholarship on the Euro crisis by recovering, and building
upon, the original Schmitter’s (1970/2002) static analytical framework, improves our
understanding of integration as a response to crises. In doing so, this paper ﬁrst analyses
the existing approaches to crisis-led integration. Then, it reconstructs and updates
Schmitter’s (1970/2002) framework, putting forward a set of hypotheses for each of the
relevant forms of spillover. Finally, the paper applies this updated framework by looking at
the several institutions, policies and procedures introduced as a reaction to the Euro crisis;
to do so, the paper relies both on the analysis of the legal acts adopted to introduce the
said policies, and on a dedicated Expert Survey carried out among 100 academics and
policy-makers working on the European Monetary Union (EMU) run in October 2018
(Annexes 2–7).
2. The standing theoretical interpretations of Euro crisis-led integration:
advantages and limitations
To understand the added-value of Schmitter’s original NFF framework, it is worth asses-
sing the standing theoretical interpretations of the crisis. Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter
(2015) enshrine their assessment of the Euro crisis in a broader, post-Maastricht trend of
integration, labelled ‘New Intergovernmentalism’ (NI). The authors suggest that today’s
EU is (generally) characterised by the creation of new (intergovernmental) institutions,
rather than supranational upgrading of existing institutions2: ‘integration take(s) place in
the absence of supranationalism’ (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015, 717). This per-
spective has been criticised in Schimmelfennig (2015a). In fact, neither liberal intergo-
vernmentalism (LI) nor Neo-neofunctionalism (NNF) exclude the possibility for new
intergovernmental institutions to emerge. NNF even labels this modus of integration as
‘spill-around’ (Schmitter 1970/2002). Secondly, both LI and NNF maintain the possibility
for old institutions to evolve, given speciﬁc conditions. Thirdly, empirical evidence pre-
sented in Jones et al., (2016), Schimmelfennig (2018a) and in this paper show that NI
expectations are factually disproved, since multiple institutions were strengthened in
their supranational capacity during the Euro crisis. Therefore, insofar supranational insti-
tutions have continued to accrue their capabilities (along with newly minted institutions),
the main institutional expectation of NI is embedded in both LI and NNF.
Conversely, the LI’s interpretation of the crisis is grounded in LI’s classical assumptions:
(a) exogenous national preferences aggregated by at the government level; (b) interde-
pendence; (c) centrality of intergovernmental bargain. Building on these, Schimmelfennig
(2015b) oﬀers an accurate application of LI to the Euro crisis. However, a LI interpretation
is insuﬃcient. To start, the assumption of exogeneity of governmental preferences
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prevents a dynamic view of integration, since it excludes both learning processes and
feedback eﬀects of integration on national preferences. By providing no space for unin-
tended consequences, LI not only considers preference change as completely exogenous
but also excludes the emersion of endogenous crises. Therefore, LI can only ensure a static
view of crises, while failing to provide a dynamic perspective on integration (as NNF does).
This remains a general problem with LI; while this article also oﬀers a static analysis of the
crisis-integration dynamics, it does so as a part of broader theoretical approach – NNF –
which features a strong dynamic component (Nicoli 2019).
Furthermore, while LI’s static assessment of the crisis explains the process of bargain-
ing that led to a certain set of institutions well, its static analysis does not fully account for
diﬀerences in the existing state of integration across policy domains (which may lead to
diverse outcomes, depending on the degree of autonomy that was previously endowed
to supranational institutions)3. Hence, LI struggles to explain those instances of integra-
tion detached from governmental initiative, such as the ‘informal’ re-interpretation of the
European Central Bank (ECB) mandate occurred in 2012, which played a key role in the
management of the crisis.4 LI also struggles to explain those instances of ﬁnancial support
that show limited intergovernmental role, such as the early European Financial
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). Third, it underestimates independent national actors,
such as national central banks or Constitutional Courts.5 In sum, LI provides a credible
account of intergovernmental negotiations, which lead to a speciﬁc type of integration
(‘spill-around’ in NNF, which also includes it), but fails to account for the diversity of
reactions to a given crisis as they manifested during the Euro crisis, whilst suﬀering from
a limited time horizon.
Classical neofunctionalist (CNF) analysis, put forward by Vilpisaukas (2013), Bauer and
Becker (2014), Ioannou and Niemann (2015) and Schimmelfennig (2018a), addresses these
shortcomings only in part. In fact, CNF is ill-suited to study crises that require integration
in ﬁelds where a treaty-base does not exist yet. Ioannou and Niemann (2015) oﬀer
a tripartite understanding of spillovers (functional, political, cultivated), but they do not
engage with integration outcomes beyond the typical spillover (that is, a form of integra-
tion characterised by increases of both autonomy and authority of supranational bodies
on a given issue). In contrast, NFF allows for a crisis to generate both diﬀerent forms of
‘spills’, and (dis)integration in diﬀerent forms. Schimmelfennig (2018a) engages with
a dynamic view of CNF, stressing how the combination of transnational interdependence
and the pre-existing supranational capacity is key in determining the (dis)integrative
outcome of a crisis. While these are very important factors in determining whether,
overall, a crisis results in more, none, or less integration, they cannot – on their own –
explain the variations across forms of integration. Hence, the CNF perspective is enriched,
once it is incorporated in the broader NNF framework.
Finally, Dawson (2015), Fabbrini (2015), and Jones et al. (2016) provide hybrid inter-
pretations of the crisis. The ﬁrst two, qualify Euro crisis-led integration as hybrid between
Intergovernmental and ‘Community-Governance’ paradigms, whilst providing
a descriptive, rather than predictive, account of the Euro crisis. Thus, their assessment
needs to be integrated into a formal theorisation. Jones et al. (2016) provide a compelling
long-term (dynamic) analysis of crisis-led integration. Building on Historical Institutionalist
(HI) accounts as well as on NF and LI approaches, they conclude that integration is
‘neofunctionalist’ in its long-term dynamics and ‘intergovernmentalist’ in its static
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reaction to crises. While of great interest for dynamic studies of integration, the main two
factors considered in the paper – élite minimalism and incompleteness of integration – do
not suﬃce alone, to explain the variety of institutional outcomes observed during
the Euro crisis. Once more, NNF can come to the rescue by incorporating these insights
in its multidimensional understanding of the conditions and outcomes of crisis-led
integration.
3. Crisis-led integration in the NNF framework
3.1. The assumptions of Neo(neo)functionalism
Neo(neo)functionalism rests on ﬁve foundational assumptions, discussed below.
3.1.1. Bounded rationality (Haas 1964, 2004)
Agents as seen as inherently rational, but their rationality is limited in time and scope.
Rational actors are subject to all sources of imperfect information, constraining their
capacity of anticipating events, leading to unforeseen consequences of decision-making.
3.1.2. Constructed preferences
Both Neo(neo)functionalism and other approaches (such as historical institutionalism)
reject the notion of strictly exogenous preferences, which instead may change through
distributional feedbacks, socialisation processes and evolution of allegiances and identi-
ties (Haas 1958, 1964; Pierson 1996; Christiansen, Jorgensen, and Wiener 1999).
3.1.3. Diﬀerentiation on the nature of policies
In Haas (1958), but – more prominently – in Hoﬀmann (1966) and Schmitter (1970),
a diﬀerentiation between “low politics” and “high politics” is advanced. While the original
Neofunctionalism (à la Haas) viewed the role of national governments as ancillary to the
actions of supranational agents and cross-national interest coalitions, NNF considers the
national governments to play a larger role in integration concerning high-politics
domains, rather than low-politics domains. However, in comparison to the intergovern-
mentalists, NNF does not exclude the potential for integration of high politics, although it
relegates it to the later cycles of integration (Kuhn and Nicoli 2019).6
3.1.4. Governments’ minimalism
NNF rests on the assumption that national governments will maintain a minimalist
integration strategy, in the attempt to resolve any outstanding problems while minimis-
ing the loss of national sovereignty at any decisional cycle (Schmitter 1970). Minimalism
deﬁnes structural bias of national leaders against transfers of sovereignty: in any given
moment, national decision-makers will not be willing to transfer powers to supranational
institutions unless they have no other option. Again, this assumption cuts across theore-
tical boundaries: originally proposed by Schmitter (1969, 1970), it is similarly found in
classical intergovernmentalists (Keohane 1984), in Historical Institutionalism (Pierson
1996, 135); and by recent mixed approaches to integration (Jones et al., 2016: 1016).
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3.1.5. Functional synergies
Finally, Neo(neo)functionalism assumes that functional synergies (or policy-interde-
pendencies) may exist between diﬀerent policy domains; in other words, certain
policies are more eﬀective when deployed on the same tier of the multilevel
governance. In extreme cases, these synergies go as far as preventing the eﬀective
functioning of the policies when these are governed at diﬀerent levels (for instance,
a single market for goods cannot properly work without a common customs union).
This set of assumptions entails three lenses through which NNF analyses the long-term
process of integration: unintended consequences, path-dependency, and cycles of integra-
tion. While these are fundamental parts of a full-ﬂedged NNF framework, they pertain to
its dynamic component (how crises and integration dynamically relate to each other)
rather than to its static one (how institutions adapt to certain crises) which is the object of
this article. These dynamic elements of NNF are discussed in further detail in Nicoli (2019),
which deals with the dynamic component of the NNF framework.
3.2. Outcomes of crisis-led integration
In NNF, the outcomes of a functional crisis can be qualiﬁed by looking into the extent
integration increases or decreases, and to the extent, new policies are governed with
intergovernmental or supranational arrangements (Schmitter 1970). In NNF; crises can
induce diﬀerent reactions: ‘spillover’, ‘spill-around’, two forms of ‘spill-backs’, and ‘encap-
sulation’. Of these, three are particularly relevant in the case of the Euro crisis: spillover is
deﬁned as ‘the simultaneous increase in both level and scope of common institutions’;
spill-around, constitutes the creation of ‘specialized (.) but strictly inter-governmental
institutions’; disintegrative spill-backs, ﬁnally, constitute the simultaneous reduction of
both autonomy and scope of common institutions (Schmitter 2002, 32–33). The two
remaining outcomes (not discussed in this article) refer to outcomes that are theoretically
possible within the NNF framework, but hardly apply to the case at hand. A weak spill-
back (or ‘retrench’, in the original terminology proposed by Schmitter) is a case in which
the scope of integration is scaled back, but the supranational nature of the common
institutions is reinforced to deal with the remaining common competences. Lastly, in the
event of an ‘encapsulation’, a major crisis is faced with no substantial alterations in neither
the governance mechanisms nor the scope of policy integration, de facto putting the
crisis-integration dynamics to rest. Considering the important institutional cases which
occurred during the Euro crisis, this article focuses on the three main outcomes: spillover,
spill-around and strong spill-back.
These possible reactions to a crisis can be visualised as a set of variations on two axes:
competences and governance (Figure 1). The setup presented here, provides a generalised
and simpliﬁed version of the diagram originally proposed by Schmitter (1970, 845). It is
worth noting that, while ‘spillover’, ‘spill-around’ and ‘spill-backs’ are juxtaposed ideal-types,
in reality, institutional solutions are placed on a continuum of possible conﬁgurations, as
suggested by Börzel (2005). While Figure 1 provides a general conceptual framework,
a speciﬁc metric for the case of the Euro crisis is introduced in Table 1 in the next section;
policies are therefore allocated in Figures 2(a,b) both on the basis of analysis of relevant
acts, and on the results of a dedicated Experts survey.
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In Figure 1, the vertical axis reports an increase/decrease in the scope of integration (i.e.
whether new functions are object of European decisions, or whether previously delegated
functions are re-nationalised); the horizontal axis concerns the increase/decrease in the
level of supranational decision-making (i.e. whether the integrated functions have
a supranational or inter-governmental governance structure). For instance if a new policy
attributes powers solely to the Commission, it would be qualiﬁed as a strong spillover; if
the decision-making process is co-decision, it would be closer to the origins, but still in
quadrant Q1; if the Council alone would take a decision, but acting by majority voting, this
would constitute a weak form of spill-around; if the decision is in the hands of the Council,
European Council, or national parliaments under consensus rule, this would clearly ﬁt in
the spill-around Q2 quadrant.
Spill-backs, i.e. reduction in the scope of integration, and, possibly, reverting of the
dynamics of integration is also a possible outcome in NNF. While all spillbacks result in
a decrease in the scope of integration, in some cases they may be accompanied by
a simultaneous increase in the national governments’ control on the remaining compe-
tences (strong spill-back, Q3). In other cases, they may instead be accompanied by an
increase in supranational governance on the remaining competences, for example, by
empowering the European Parliament (‘retrench’, Q4).
3.3. Factors and mechanisms
Whether a crisis, ultimately, results in a spillover, a spill-arounds, spill-backs or encapsula-
tion depends on multiple factors and their interactions. Before putting forward speciﬁc
expectations for each of the quadrants of Figure 1, we recall the main factors involved.
A ﬁrst set of factors concerns the horizontal displacement in Figure 1 (between inter-
governmental and supranational governance).
Figure 1. Functional outcomes.
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3.3.1. Nature of the policy
Since policies are assumed to be diverse in nature, the integration in “high politics” is
more likely to happen under the strict oversight of national authorities, rather than in the
integration in “low politics”, unless other conditions are met.
3.3.2. Degree of common identity
The stronger a sense of common identiﬁcation or belonging to a common polity in the
population, the more likely are supranational institutions to acquire competences in high-
politics (and the opposite when there is no sense of shared identity) 7
3.3.3. Governance interdependencies
Crises associated with mismatches between national decisions (which could in principle,
be composed) are more likely to result in intergovernmental coordination instruments,
(a)
(b)
Figure 2. (a) Crisis outcomes (based on legislation). (b) Crisis outcomes (based on Experts survey).
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while crises associated with free-riding or moral-hazard behaviour that lead certain
countries to generate externalities on the community are more likely to result in instru-
ments aiming to insulate policy-making.
A second set of factors concerns displacements over the integration/disintegration
axis:
3.3.4. Degree of pre-existing integration
Due to path-dependency, new policies and institutions are more likely to be introduced in
those ﬁelds where integration is already developed (Schimmelfennig 2018a).
3.3.5. Autonomy of supranational actors
Since national governments are characterised by minimalism, integration is expected to
be more far-reaching, the more autonomous are supranational actors in taking decisions
in a given ﬁeld.
3.3.6. Policy interdependence
Movements on the integration/disintegration axis are likely to be stronger, the higher the
degree of interdependence between policy ﬁelds located at diﬀerent layers of govern-
ance; that is, the more dysfunctional is the distance between integrated and non-
integrated policies, the more likely is such a distance to be reduced in one direction or
the another.
3.3.7. Distribution of the costs of non-integration
Movements on the integration/disintegration axis are more likely to happen when the
costs of a crisis are distributed evenly among participating countries. Meaning, the larger
the number of countries unaﬀected by a crisis, the less likely is integration to happen,
since the status-quo constitutes for those countries a credible way forward.
By combining these factors, we advance speciﬁc hypotheses concerning the nature of
the outcomes in a given crisis. The remainder of this section discusses the relationships
characterising the ideal-types of spillover, spill-around, and disintegrative spill-back;8 the
stronger the relationships hypothesised above, the further away from the centre (in the
appropriate quadrant) the relevant policies are expected to be.
Spillover (quadrant 1): While all kinds of spillover imply an increase in competences, we can
distinguish three main types of spillover according to qualitatively diﬀerent governance
settings (building on Niemann and Ioannou 2015): a “technocratic spillover” (based on
insulation), implies an increase of independent surveillance and supervision powers of
supranational actors, a “cultivated spillover”, which is grounded in pre-existing autonomy
of supranational actors; and a “political spillover” based on co-decision, implying that new
powers are managed through a classic Parliament-Executive dynamics, implemented at EU
level through the Ordinary Legislative Procedure.
First (mechanism 1.1), technocratic spillovers are likely to appear when governance interdepen-
dence is high (that is, there is a need to prevent free-riding, increase supervision and/or achieve
insulation, and achieve external monitoring/control of the given competence – for instance, to
prevent prisoner-dilemma like situations or ensure compliance – (Majone 1997)). Second
(mechanism 1.2.1), if policy interdependence is high, and the policy ﬁeld concerned is “low-
politics”, then a spillover is likely. Third (mechanism 1.2.2), if policy interdependence is high, the
policy ﬁeld concerned is “high politics” (or a “fundamental competence of nation states”:
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Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009, 252) and there is a degree of shared identity, then a political
spillover is likely. Finally (mechanism 1.3), if policy interdependence is high, and the agencies are
suﬃciently developed to have the power to re-interpret their mandate in autonomy, then
a cultivated spillover is likely.
Spill-around (quadrant 2): Given the “minimalism” inherent to NNF, a “spill-around” would
be the default solution when integration in a new ﬁeld is required to address a given crisis.
Building the conditions described in the previous section, the following relationships are
advanced: First (mechanism .2.1), if a given competence is, ex ante, mostly under control of
national authorities, and governance interdependence is low (that is coordination, rather
than insulation, is required) then a spill-around outcome is likely. Second (mechanism .2.2), if
policy-interdependence is high, but the competence object of integration is perceived as
“high politics” and there is a lack of common identiﬁcation, then a spill-around is likely, since
in absence of a shared identity, Governments (and their Constitutional Courts) would defend
national prerogatives by requiring unanimity-voting procedures. Third (mechanism .2.3), if
the costs of inaction are particularly large, but unevenly distributed among states, the less-hit
states will seek to maintain control over the policy decisions, hence leading to a spill-around.
spill-backs (quadrant 3): First (mechanism 3.1), if the crisis is attributed solely to the
mismanagement of a given power/competence of the supranational level, then a spill-back
is likely. Second (mechanism .3.2), if policy interdependence is very high (making the status
quo unsustainable), but the costs of integration are larger than the costs of disintegration,
then spill-back is likely. Finally, (mechanism 3.3), if the Union is in a “lock-up” crisis9 and the
crisis-induced paralysis has completely eroded output legitimacy without a feedback eﬀects
on national preferences leading to a shared solution, then a strong spill-back is likely.
These mechanisms cover the main relationships leading to spillovers, spill-arounds and
spill-backs; it is possible that other mechanisms leading to these outcomes exist.
Regardless, this paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive test for all the many
hypotheses of NNF; it aims to assess whether Euro crisis-induced integration ﬁts in the
expectations that NNF puts forward. In doing so, Section 4 provides an overview of the
main instances of integration, which occurred between 2010 and 2016, by using up to 15
diﬀerent policies, institutions and procedures. The analysis is based on a two-fold empiri-
cal approach: a review of all relevant legal texts, and a dedicated Expert survey run among
about 100 policy-makers, academics and think-tankers, many of whom were directly
involved in the setting-up of the various instruments of the new economic governance
(Annex 2).
4. Eurocrisis-induced integration: which kind of outcomes?
4.1. Operationalisation
This section provides an empirical assessment of the main expectations of NNF in the case
of the Euro crisis. Table 1 in the online supplement recalls all policies and institutions, which
were introduced to address it. The assessment is grounded on analysis of all legislation and
acts associated with each of the 13 policies & institutions introduced, and on the dedicated
Experts Survey.10 Experts have been asked to assess (inter-alia) how much, in their opinion,
integration was pushed forward (or backward) by each of these changes; what were the
most determining factors; and how they would evaluate the governance of these institu-
tions and policies. When looking at legislation, particular attention has been devoted to
evaluating formal decisional mechanisms and the (formalised) rationale for the policy (as
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contained in the recitals, in the accompanying Commission Communications, and/or in the
ﬁrst articles of the regulations/directives/decisions).
The goal of the analysis is twofold: ﬁrst, we aim to understand which new policies and
institutions ﬁt into the particular quadrants of Figure 1. Second, we aim to see whether
our expectations concerning each of the quadrants are respected. Hence, the two axes of
Figure 1 are operationalised through qualitative metrics, which are then checked against
actual legislation and experts’ opinion. Values are scaled accordingly to the degree of
expansion in competences, and the kind of governance adopted.
The following policies and institutions are considered: the reformed Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) and the novel Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP; the European
Semester (ES, in its 2011, 2013 and 2015 versions)); the European Financial Stabilisation
Mechanism (EFSM); the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and its precedent version, the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF); the European Fund for Strategic Investment
(EFSI); the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG); the Outright Monetary
Transactions programme (OMT) and the implicit ECB mandate change it involves; the
Supervisory pillar of the Banking Union (SBU) and the resolution pillar of the Banking
Union (RBU); the 2015 ﬂexibility clause. The governance of these institutions as well as
the redistributive eﬀects they produce (Annex 4) vary substantially.
Figures 2(a,b) present the overall results on the basis of legislation analysis (Figure 2(a))
and of the dedicated Expert Survey (Figure 2(b); Annex 3). While there are some diﬀer-
ences between the two results, the overlap between the two plots is remarkable and
supports the intuition that neither the spillover (prime mechanism in CNF), nor the spill-
around (prime mechanism in LIG) can (on their own) explain crisis-led integration. The
remainder of this paper is dedicated to the investigation of the various instances of
spillovers and spill-arounds, discussing our expectations in light of the legislation and
the information collected in the Experts Survey.
4.2. Instances of spill-around
4.2.1. The EFSM
The earliest case of spill-around is the creation of the EFSM in 2010 (regulation 407/2010).
The Fund was set up in the wake of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis and was grounded
explicitly in the ‘solidarity’ clause enshrined in article 122 of the TFEU, with the aim of
addressing exceptional circumstances beyond member state control, as stressed in the
regulation’s recitals. From a legal point of view, the regulation mirrors the mechanism
established for non-Eurozone countries in 2002, for balance-of-payment assistance.
Consequently, the Commission becomes a borrower on behalf of the member state,
resulting in very low interest rates thanks to the implicit guarantee provided by the EU
budget. De facto, the EFSM was a vehicle of debt mutualisation: the maximal number of
‘Eurobonds’ created is set at 60 Billion Euros. Its governance system depends on the
Commission and the Council’s qualiﬁed majority; this qualiﬁes the EFSM as a hybrid
institutional form, a very weak instance of spill-around. This is conﬁrmed by the average
scores in the Expert Survey, attributing to the EFSM a score of 3.4 on the integration scale
(close to ‘a minor development’) and a score of 2.2 on the governance scale (‘rather
intergovernmental’). Qualifying the EFSM as a spill-around conforms it with our mechan-
ism 2.2, since debt mutualisation is seen as high politics with important redistributive
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consequences (Annex 4). However, since the EFSM had a limited ﬁrepower using the
Union’s own budget and built on existing legal capacity (both articles 122 TFEU and
regulation 332/2002), its governance mechanism is closer to co-decision than the EFSF
and ESM.
4.2.2. The ESM
A (much stronger) spill-around is constituted by the funds that followed the EFSM: the EFSF
and subsequently, the ESM. The creation of the ESM, being a much larger rescue fund with
a lending capacity up to 800 Billion Euros, could not be grounded in art. 122. This funding is
provided directly by the member states, in the form of paid-in capital and further guaran-
tees. By 2012, the interpretation of the crisis had shifted from being a purely exogenous
phenomenon ‘outside of member states control’, to be the consequence of debt misman-
agement in individual countries, which were posing a threat to the Eurozone as such. Article
136, which prohibited central ﬁnancing of national budgets, had to be amended in 2011 in
order to permit bailouts. A dedicated treaty setting up the new mechanism was signed in
June 2012 and entered into force in October. From a legal perspective the ESM is purely
inter-governmental: there is no governing role for the Commission and all decisions are
taken by representatives of the participating member states.11 The key power entitled to
the ESM, namely to provide ﬁnancial support, is to be taken by consensus of all participants
(art. 5.6-ESM, detailed in art. 16.5-ESM). Furthermore, several states have enacted national
legislation for ex-ante or ex-post authorisation from their national parliaments, reinforcing –
in the latter case – the intergovernmental logic of the instrument (Kreillinger and Larhant
2016). Again, this is in accordance with the Expert Survey results, which assign a score of 4.4
on the integration scale (‘a major development’) and a score of 1.6 on the governance scale
(‘purely intergovernmental’). All three spill-aroundmechanisms are present in the ESM case.
As not only ﬁscal issues are high-politics of strict competence of national authority
(mechanisms 2.1 and 2.2); but also the costs of inaction were so asymmetric, that the
countries eﬀectively ﬁnancing the mechanisms could retain a veto power (occasionally, for
multiple national institutions), making the ESM the strongest example of spill-around in
the Euro crisis.
4.2.3. The European semester
A third case of (weak) spill-around is constituted the progressive establishment of the
European Semester of policy coordination, introduced informally by an Ecﬁn agreement
in 2010, codiﬁed in December 2011 (amended regulation 1466/97) and reformed again in
2013. The European Semester did not introduce, as such, new instruments, but it provided
a much-strengthened coordination of existing tools. The European Semester inherited the
practice of economic policy coordination applied in Europe, since the Maastricht Treaty, in
particular the ‘Broad Economic Policy Guidelines’ and the ‘employment guidelines’ (the
main building blocks of the so-called ‘open method of coordination[OMC]’ introduced to
achieve the goals of the Lisbon 2010 Agenda- Deroose, Hodson, and Kuhlmann 2008), the
‘national reform programmes’ that member states had to deliver as a part of the OMC, and
the ‘stability plans’ delivered according with the SGP. The 2011 reform integrated the
guidelines into a single document of economic policy, the Annual Growth Survey (AGS)
approved by the European Commission in October each year. In March 2013 the process
was strengthened even further, by adding a supervision of the actual implementation of
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commitments in budgetary laws, to be submitted to the Commission by October. From
a legal perspective, the European Semester is fundamentally a mixed procedure: while the
Commission has a limited independent authority through the AGS (which holds no legal
value) and through the proposals of recommendations, all acts coordinated through the
European Semester either originated in member states, or need to be validated by
a majority in the Council. The only relevant exception is the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure,
which is to be discussed in the next section, is an integral part of the Semester but
constitutes a case study of its own. Expert assessment is in line with this intuition, scoring
2.7 on the governance axis (close to ‘mixed method’) and 3.4 on the integration axis (‘a
minor development’). As a strengthened coordination instrument of policies, which
remain, fundamentally, of national competence, the European Semester ﬁts properly in
mechanism 2.1.
4.2.4. The macroeconomic imbalances procedure
Along with the European Semester, a fourth case of weak spill-around is constituted by
the creation of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) in 2011, grounded in
articles 121 and 126 TFEU. From a legal perspective, the procedure allows the Commission
to monitor the overall macroeconomic development of member states and eventually
propose sanctions against member states failing to address their internal imbalances.
Nonetheless, the ﬁnal decision on sanctioning is entitled to the majority of the Council.
Moreover, as the decision is based upon a plurality of indicators (the Macroeconomic
Imbalances Scoreboard), the violation of one single parameter is not suﬃcient to trigger
the sanctions. This allows for larger ﬂexibility in the hands of member states, when
assessing the Commission’s recommendations, making it easy for a coalition of states to
turn down a request of sanctioning. The expert survey scores support this assessment,
evaluating the MIP governance with a score of 2.8 (just short of ‘mixed method’) despite
the sanctioning power bestowed upon the Commission. Provided that economic policy is
a competence of nation states and the treaty provides only for enhanced coordination of
national policies, the creation of the MIP ﬁts into mechanism 2.1 as the European
Semester, whereby strengthened coordination instruments are deployed to ensure eco-
nomic convergence of national economies.
4.3. Instances of spillover
In some instances, crisis-led integration has resulted in spillovers, where both the com-
petences of the supranational institutions and their autonomy are expanded.
4.3.1. The ECB mandate ‘Reinterpretation’
A ﬁrst instance of spillover is constituted by the ECB’s reinterpretation of its own mandate
through the well-known 26 July 2012 ‘whatever it takes’ speech by the ECB president
Mario Draghi; the following setting up of the OMT programme (2 August 2012) and the
beginning of the Quantitative Easing in late 2014. The ﬁnancial eﬀects of the two
announcements were sizeable (Altavilla, Giannone, and Lenza 2014) and considerably
decreased the interest payments on several member states. While earlier the mandate of
the ECB was perceived to be solely to maintain price stability in the Eurozone, the ECB
argued that for monetary policy to work, ﬁnancial fragmentation must be avoided;
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ﬁnancial fragmentation induced by fears of EMU breakup, translated into ‘exceptionally
high-risk premia hindering the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy’ (European Central Bank
2012). Therefore, insofar the countries are willing to act domestically to reduce their risk
premia, the ECB protects the irreversibility of the Euro.
From a legal point of view this reasoning – although still grounded in the fundamental
ECB mandate of the ECB to conduct monetary policy of the Euro system (art. 282 TFEU)
with the aim of maintaining price stability (art. 127 TFEU) – extended this mandate to the
preservation of the Euro system itself (without which no Euro system monetary policy is
possible)12. This produced two side-eﬀects; ﬁrst, it induced the ECB to take a stance on
non-monetary aspects of economic policy; second, it led to a substantial increase in the
ECB’s public bond holdings, which have redistributive implications (Sinn and
Wollmershuser, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Bundesverfassungsgericht 2016). The
OMT programme and the QE are only partially within the competences conferred upon
the ECB: while a preliminary ruling favorable to the OMT has been released on
14 January 2015 by the ECJ, a decision from the Bundesverfassungsgericht delivered in
June 2016 maintains that further conditions must be in place for the OMT to remain
within the EVB mandate, thus opening the doors to future challenges from claimants. The
expert assessment is uncontroversial regarding the nature of the ECB mandate interpreta-
tion, which scores the highest both on the integration and the governance scale, qualify-
ing it as a spillover. Furthermore, the ECB mandate reinterpretation ﬁts into mechanism
1.3, the ECB being a long-standing, independent agency able to redeﬁne its mandate in
(relative) autonomy, even when this produces important redistributive eﬀects (see
Annex 4) encountering an institutional pushback from powerful domestic institutions
(such as the Bundesverfassungsgericht).
4.3.2. The banking union
A second case of a spillover in the European Banking Union (EBU), which is composed by
the supervisory pillar (established through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)13)
and the resolution pillar (established through the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)14).
The process leading to the EBU is described in Glöcker, Linder, and Salines (2017) through
an historical-institutionalist perspective, emphasising the learning process and the role of
non-state actors in shaping policy evolution, and by Epstein and Rhodes (2016) who
instead stressed its neofunctionalist nature. Zeitlin (2016) focuses instead on the experi-
mental features of the SSM, especially concerning the consultation with national autho-
rities in the inception of tailor-made solutions for larger banks. Nonetheless, any ﬁnal
decision remains solely in the hands of an ECB appointee.
From a legal perspective, the supervisory pillar of the Banking Union confers upon the
ECB the task of supervising large credit institutions at European level. Beforehand, super-
vision of the banking sector was held at national level; coordination was achieved through
three linked institutions introduced in 2010 (the European Banking Authority and the
related Insurance and Securities Authorities). However, this constituted an ineﬃcient
mechanism of coordination, resulting in uncertainty in supervisory tasks for cross-
border lending, and additional risks associated with domestic oversight of banks (often
engaged in extensive lending to the public sector itself). The SSM, in other words, was
created to address the shortcomings of existing coordination centralising supervisory
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tasks15, ﬁtting well with mechanism 1.1. In accordance, expert assessment qualiﬁes the
SSM as a clear spillover, scoring 4.7/6 and 3.3/5 on the integration and governance scale,
respectively.
The SRM is the second pillar of the Banking Union. The Board of the SRM it is composed
by delegates of both the Commission and the National Resolution Authorities of the
Member states (art. 43). The executive of the Board (Chair, vice-chair and four permanent
members) is fully appointed by the Commission and approved by the European
Parliament and the Council (art.56.6). Despite the relevance of national delegates, the
body enjoys full independence (art.47); it is accountable to the Commission and the
Parliament; most decisions are taken by simple majority (art.52.1). Although the entrance
into force of the Single Resolution Fund managed by the SRM is linked to the ratiﬁcation
of an international treaty (the Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of
Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund), the Board acquires – once the ratiﬁcation
process is completed – independent powers on the Fund’s budget. Furthermore, the
rationale for the SRM is to explicitly achieve a better insulation and coordination16, ﬁtting
therefore with mechanism.1.1. On the other hand, the SRM is a clear case of risk-sharing
mechanism: we would expect a spill-around rather than a spillover. However, the SRM is
a sui-generis example of risk-sharing: the public power is exonerated from contributing in
the Single Resolution Fund, which is completely set up by contributions of the banking
sector. Since no taxation is involved and solidarity is expressed through the banking
sector’s own contributions, a degree of collective identiﬁcation is not required to enable
this form of risk-sharing.17 For comparison, 89% of our surveyed experts agree that other
elements of the economic governance would have been far more ambitious, if collective
European identities were stronger.
4.3.3. The EFSI
Finally, a fourth case of spillover is constituted by the creation of the EFSI. Although the
Fund relies on a mix of ﬁnancial contributions from the member states delivered on
a voluntary basis and of a smaller amount of resources drawn from the EU budget, both
the inception of the Fund and its structure are of clear functional origins. The Fund was
promised by the (then-candidate) Juncker during his campaign to win the European
Elections and secure a political nomination to the European Commission Presidency.
The Fund’s design is to be read in light of the ﬂexible communication discussed below,
which states that both initial ﬁnancing to the Fund (Communication 12/2015:6) and
contributions to the co-ﬁnancing of the projects (ibid: 8) will not be considered in
computing deﬁcit and debt threshold for what concerns the SGP requirements. Put
simply, channeling their investment plans through the Fund provides member-states
with a ‘golden rule’ for which investment is not computed as deﬁcit for the application
of the ﬁscal rule. Again, the instrument seems to empower national governments, but in
fact strengthens the leading role of the Commission, since there is no automaticity
between Fund’s contributions and disbursements. The managing of the Fund is left to
the Steering Board, composed for 75% by EC oﬃcials and for 25% by EIB oﬃcials. The
independence of the Board is emphasized in art. 7.4 of the Regulation, excluding mem-
ber-states from the management; yet, the EP has little formal role in the Fund. The EFSI
constitutes, therefore, a hybrid case of political-technocratic spillover. If we look at its
origins, its political nature is evident: it was incepted as a political promise in the ﬁrst
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European Elections featuring a leading candidate, and it was pushed forward despite
possibly producing redistributive eﬀects, because its legitimation came from a pan-
European electoral campaign. However, contrary to the expectation for political spillovers,
the resulting governance is not resulting in a parliamentary-executive dynamic (as
expected for political spillovers), having a rather technocratic governing structure. This
hybrid spillover nature of the EFSI is supported by experts’ opinion, that qualiﬁes the EFSI
governance as ‘mixed-method’.
4.4. Controversial cases
In two cases, there is a contradiction between the Expert Survey and the legal analysis.
4.4.1. The SGP reform
The Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is one of the two cases of contrasting
results between the legal assessment and the expert survey. While on the basis of legal
assessment- the SGP reform clearly qualiﬁes as a spillover, the Expert Survey assessment
places it slightly below the MIP and the Semester, both in the integration and governance
scales. Originally introduced in 1997, the SGP was modiﬁed in 2011, tightening the ﬁscal
adjustment thresholds for Euro Area member states and introducing the Reversed
Majority Voting principle on sanctions to break the Council gridlock that had prevented
the Commission from taking action in the pre-crisis years. In the new setting introduced in
2011, the Commission acquired a large autonomy vis-à-vis the member states, being
granted the automatic approval of decisions on infringement unless member states in the
Council succeeds in crafting an opposing majority. This corresponds to the NNG expecta-
tion on widening of autonomy of supranational agencies, when there is a need of
increased insulation (mechanism 1.1 & 1.3). On the other hand, the Expert Survey results –
albeit considering the SGP governance as something more than an intergovernmental
institution (2.7) fall short of qualifying the SGP governance as mixed method; the
Commission is only marginally considered as more important than governments in the
management of the SGP (see Annex 2). Most likely, this is due to the fact that the
Commission is politically constrained in its action despite the increase in formal powers;
as a result, the Commission engages in long bilateral negotiations (as a part of the
European Semester process) with the governments of the member states at risk of
infringement. While the SGP reform boosted the powers of the Commission in these
negotiations, the initiation of an infringement procedure still includes a considerable role
for the member state in question.
4.4.2. The ﬂexibility clause
The ﬂexibility clause was introduced in February 2015. Member states can ease their ﬁscal
adjustment path towards the Medium-Term Objective (MTO) as long as, they coordinate
their structural reforms’ eﬀort with the European Commission (European Commission
(2015) Communication 12/2015: 9–14). From a formal perspective, this strengthens the
supranational nature of the SGP, since the deﬁnition of ‘structural reform’ is left open in
the Communication. Although criteria for eligible reforms are set (the reform must be
‘major’, with ‘long-term positive budgetary eﬀects’, and must be ‘fully implemented’-
ibid.:10), several minor reforms may be aggregated in ‘well-designed comprehensive
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packages of reforms (.) which reinforce each other’s impact through an appropriate choice
of policy mix and sequencing of implementation’ (ibid: 10). The assessment of all these
conditions is left to the sole judgment of the European Commission. The same applies to
diction ‘long-term positive budgetary eﬀects’, whereby it is stated that reforms boosting
potential output may be included in the list. The Communication provides such a margin
of appreciation for the Commission, to the point of weakening the SGP rules of parts of
their cogent power. However, while the rule-based mechanism is weakened in favour of
a political assessment of the process of ﬁscal consolidation, such political discretion is
bestowed upon the Commission (rather than on the Member-State).18 This would suggest
that the ﬂexibility clause is a form of spillover, aligning with mechanism.1.1 (need for
insulation) and 1.3 (autonomy). Regardless of whether we look at the ﬂexibility clause
from a legal perspective or from the point of view of experts, its impact on integration is
limited (experts rate it between ‘no appreciable changes’ and ‘a minor development’).
However, experts see the ﬂexibility clause, as a rather intergovernmental endeavor (score
of 2.6 on the governance axis) since it increases the options available for member states;
even if the Commission, rather than the member-states, acquires a new degree of political
discretion that was not available before.
5. Conclusions
The paper set out to explore the added value of Neo-Neofunctionalism (NNF), as an
encompassing theory of crisis-led integration. Building on previous NNF scholarship, it
theorises both spillovers and spill-arounds as possible outcomes of crisis-led integration,
depending on a variety of factors and expectations. These expectations are then explored
by means of a detailed analysis of legal texts, complemented by dedicated Experts Survey
on the New Economic Governance.
Of all episodes of integration occurred in the wake of the Euro crisis, four are typical
spillover eﬀects with a prominent role for insulated, supranational institutions: the two
pillars of the Banking Union, the EFSI, the OMT/QE of the ECB. Three procedures are weak
forms of spill-around, where governments are the ultimate decision-makers through their
ministers in the Council, but only in dialogue with the Commission itself and through
majority voting: this is the case of the ESFM, the MIP, and the European Semester in
general. On the other hand, clear cases of strong spill-arounds are the EFSF/ESM and the
TSCG. Finally, two institutional changes (the SGP reform and the Flexibility clause) yield
inconsistent results between the expert survey and the assessment of legal texts. While
governments have surely played a fundamental and visible role in the decision-making
process that led to the creation of many those institutions (with the relevant exception of
the OMT and of the EFSI) many of these institutions are forms of spillovers, increasing
both the authority and the reach of supranational institutions. Governments could not
play any smaller role in the decision-making process, provided that most of the policies
object of integration during the crisis were still national competence when the Lisbon
Treaty entered into force, and therefore great caution was adopted to avoid cases of ‘ultra
vires’ violations of the EU mandate (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2012).
Overall, the paper shows that NNF can credibly integrate insights from both classical
Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, producing an overall theory of crisis-
led integration encompassing several types and modes of regional build-up in a testable
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manner. Furthermore, the theory is open to expectations leading to dis-integration,
although such outcomes are not assessed in this paper.
Despite the insights provided, a major limitation of the paper is the lack of analysis on
how preferences of individual member states and social groups (both between, and
across, national boundaries) have inﬂuenced these outcomes. Indeed, the ﬁnal institu-
tional choice represented in Figure 2(a,b), despite having brought integration forward,
diﬀers quite substantially from the majority of designs and plans for Eurozone presented
during the crisis years, thus falling short of many policy-makers’ expectations. As for
December 2018, the gap between the degree of integration eﬀectively achieved and
the ‘grand’ plans for EMU stabilisation is exempliﬁed by the lack of any sort of common
ﬁscal instrument to ease the hardship of internal adjustment. A careful analysis of these
preferences would likely attribute to such gap to divergent national positions, suggesting
that the theory should be extended, so to explain not only cases of successful integration,
but also episodes of integration that failed to take place; these latter, usually excluded by
Neofunctionalist scholarship.
Notes
1. The original Functionalist theory was developed by Mitrany in the interwar period. By classical
Neofunctionalism (CNF) we mean the ﬁrst novel iteration of the theory, proposed by Haas
(1958); Haas (1964) and Lindberg (1963). By Neo-Neofunctionalism (NNF) we mean the
updated version of the theory, developed in two steps by Schmitter (1970, 2002). The latter
provides both a static and dynamic analysis of crisis-led integration. This paper develops
further the static analysis proposed by NNF.
2. According to NI, changes may also occur to existing institutions, but usually, this would (a)
strengthen the leading role of intergovernmental bodies, and (b) further qualify the
Commission and other supranational bodies as agents and implementers of the intergovern-
mental agenda (Bickerton et al., 2015).
3. Schimmelfennig (2018b, 24) notes, ‘the common EU interest in the Euro and Brexit crises (.)
were facilitated by high supranational capacities’.
4. In June 2012 the ECB president, Mario Draghi, indicated that the ECB core mandate of price
stability implied a mandate to protect the survival of the Eurozone, even if this is not formally
stated in the ECB statute.
5. In fact, the most credible challenge to further integration, including against the 2012 ECB
mandate re-interpretation, came from the Bundesverfassungsericht, which is insulated from
governmental decisions.
6. Clearly, this is not unique to NNF; the diﬀerentiation between high and low politics is a key
feature of intergovernmentalist approaches (Hoﬀmann 1966). In classical intergovernment-
alism, integration never takes place in the ﬁeld of high politics. Diﬀerently from classical
intergovernmentalists (and closer to Neofunctionalists), New Intergovernmentalists consider
that integration may occur also in high politics, under certain conditions. Finally, Historical
Institutionalism also maintains that in critical junctures (i.e. moments of supranational con-
stitutional change) national decision-makers maintain a key role in shaping the outcomes of
constitutional ‘grand-bargains’ (Pierson 1996).
7. This is, to a large extent, derived from research done on the interplay between high politics,
core state powers, redistribution and the ‘no-demos thesis’; see, for instance, Weiler (2001),
Zurn (2000), Nicoli (2017b), Kuhn and Nicoli (2019).
8. We do not hypothesize, at this stage, the conditions possibly leading to encapsulation or
retrench, due to space constraints and to the fact that they do not apply to the Eurocrisis in
particular. Schmitter (1970/2002) provides an initial set of intuitions in this regard.
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9. I.e. a situation where the status quo is costly for everyone, but moving outside of it in any
direction is costlier of the status quo for a subset of actors strong enough to exert a veto. It is
the case, for instance, of most ‘trilemma-like’ situations.
10. Annex 1 contains an overview of the Survey questions and broad descriptive statistics.
11. In a recent case (Ledra Advertising, September 2016) the ECJ recognised the role of the
European Commission in the management of the ESM and of the following programmes,
de facto bringing the ESM in the European legal sphere despite its original nature of separate
international organization (Glinavos 2016).
12. In fact, this reasoning is not dissimilar from the reasoning applied to justify the autonomous
expansion of the ECJ competences and introduced the principle of primacy of European Law
in the Costa-vs-Enel case in 1964.
13. Regulation 1024/2013.
14. Regulation 806/2014.
15. Recitals 9–12 of regulation 1024/2013.
16. Recitals 2–4, 9–10 of regulation 806/2014.
17. For a discussion of the relationship between European identity and redistribution, see Nicoli
(2017b) in this journal.
18. This constitutes a departure from both the wishes of core member-states which were looking
for a stronger set of rules and from those of peripheral member-states, which were looking
for a repatriation of decision-making power on ﬁscal issues.
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